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I. INTRODUCTION
Patent law arises under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United
States Constitution, which gives Congress the power to promote "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 1 Invention occurs in many forms, and patent law
expressly protects both processes and products, the latter in the nature of
machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter.2 As
early as 100 years ago, however, this short listing proved to be inade-
quate to protect all types of inventions. Accordingly, courts began to
recognize a hybrid: a product-by-process patent claim, that describes
the invention of an end product in terms of how it is produced, rather
than through the more typical functional or structural description.'
A product-by-process patent claim is distinguishable from both pro-
cess claims and product claims. If a claim is phrased to protect a prod-
uct, that is, the product is described functionally or structurally, then that
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Ex parte Painter, 1891 C.D. 200 (Comm'r of Pats. 1891).
Product-by-process patent claims describe an invention in terms of how it is produced rather
than through the more typical functional or structural description. Eric P. Mirabel, Product-by-
Process Claims: A Practical Perspective, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMAR OFF. Soc'Y 3 (1986). Such
claims are often used by companies to patent complex drug or chemical products whose structure
is not completely understood and, therefore, can only be accurately described by the process
through which it is made. Don J. DeBenedictis, Inconsistent Patent Rulings, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1992, at 36.
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product will be the subject of any litigation that ensues. For example, if
an inventor creates a new chemical named "X"', and the inventor wishes
to acquire a patent for X, he should file a product claim. Suppose that
chemical X is a zeolite compound (a substance commonly used as a
catalyst to "crack" heavy crude oil to produce lighter fractions) such as
gasoline. To claim this compound, the inventor might use the following
language: "The product is a nitrogen crystalline metal silicate having a
zeolite structure." This language would protect the product.
If the inventor instead develops a new, more efficient method of
producing X, rather than inventing X itself, a process claim would be
proper. The process inventor would not seek to claim X itself; the appli-
cation would only cover the newly discovered method. He could claim
this new process as follows: "The process consists of adding a metal
oxide and a silicon dioxide source that is essentially free of alkali metal
to a 90% aqueous solution of chemical A. The mixture is then heated,
producing chemical X." This language would protect the new process.
Assume again that the inventor has created X. This X, however, is a
new, state-of-the-art product, and neither the inventor nor the most bril-
liant engineers understands its structure. The inventor knows the steps
he used to make X, but is unsure of the exact structural makeup of X.
The inventor would best protect the invention from infringement by fil-
ing a product-by-process claim.
In a product-by-process claim, a product is protected, even though
the product is described by the process that produces it. An infringe-
ment suit involving a product-by-process claim is complicated, in that
such a claim often protects a product that can only be described by
explaining how it is made, using process terms. Chemical X could be
described in product-by-process terms as follows: "Chemical X is made
by adding a metal oxide and a silicon dioxide source that is essentially
free of alkali metal to a 90% aqueous solution of chemical A. The mix-
ture is then heated, producing X." The subtle, but extremely significant,
difference between the process claim and the product-by-process claim
is that the process claim protects only the process used to create X. The
product-by-process claim does not necessarily protect the process, but it
does protect the end product, X. Product-by-process claims are fre-
quently used by pharmaceutical and chemical companies to protect the
fruits of their expensive research and development.'
4. The price of developing new chemicals continues to rise each year. Jim Impoco, Green
Genes: The Biotechnology Industry Struggles Once Again to Splice a Healthy-and Profitable-
Future, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 18, 1993, at 58, 59. In 1990, the pharmaceutical industry
spent an average of $230 million to bring a new chemical from the laboratory to the market, and
only one out of every 5,000 or 10,000 compounds discovered actually reached the market. Roger
A. Brooks, Statement Made at AIPLA Meeting (May 14, 1992), in Am. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N
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Although product-by-process patents are relatively easy to describe
and claim, their recognition and protection results from a somewhat tor-
tured history. Furthermore, these patents have been the center of recent
and apparently conflicting decisions by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. In 1991, that court held in Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech Inc.' that an inventor who holds a product-by-pro-
cess patent claim can maintain an infringement suit against anyone who
makes the same product, even if the product is produced through a dif-
ferent process.' Sixteen months later, however, in Atlantic Thermoplas-
tics Co. v. Faytex Corp.,7--a ruling that some experts labeled "heresy"8
and others acclaimed 9-- a separate panel of the Court determined that a
product-by-process patent holder can only sue those who make the same
product by the identical process.'
The court's internal debate over the proper scope of protection for
product-by-process claims continued when the ten active judges of the
Federal Circuit decided first by a vote of 7-3, and later by a vote of 6-4,
against rehearing Atlantic Thermoplastics en banc.'' The second denial
sparked four vigorous dissents' 2 and, one month later, a lengthy concur-
rence by Judge Randall R. Rader, author of the Atlantic Thermoplastics
decision.1
3
This Comment traces and analyzes the history of infringement of
BULL., 1992, at 475. The 1993 price tag for bringing a new drug to market is $125 million.
Impoco, supra. The costs for both chemicals and drugs will continue to rise, partly because the
United States government is funding less research. Id. at 59. As a result, the struggling
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries can no longer afford to invest in risky projects. Id.
5. 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
6. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583-84.
7. 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
8. Judge Giles S. Rich, a co-author of the 1952 Patent Act who was originally appointed to
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") by President Eisenhower in 1956, asserted
that the Atlantic Thermoplastics opinion insulted the Scripps panel and described it as "mutiny."
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rich, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
9. Wayne State University Law School professor Martin J. Adelman commented that the
Atlantic Thermoplastics panel's narrow view of product-by-process patent claims is preferable and
that Judge Rich's dissent was "intemperate." DeBenedictis, supra note 3, at 36.
10. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846-47.
11. Although there were fifteen judges sitting on the Federal Circuit when the Court declined
en banc review, only judges with active, and not senior, status consider actions en banc. See FED.
R. App. P. 47, 35(a).
12. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1280-99 (Nies, C.J., and Rich, Newman, and Lourie,
J.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). The most detailed dissent came from Judge
Pauline Newman, who authored the Scripps opinion. Judge Newman exclaimed: "[s]hould this
court now wish to restrict patent protection for inventions of complex biological products that are
necessarily identified by how they were made, it should be done en banc . I..." d. at 1298.
13. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1299 (Rader, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing
en banc).
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product-by-process patent claims. It also examines the diametrically
opposed rulings of the Federal Circuit, looking for consistency with
Title 35 of the United States Code.' 4 This analysis requires an inquiry
into the purpose behind patent protection-the promotion of science and
useful arts' 5-and the uniqueness of products that can, and often can
only, be described by the process that makes them.
The remainder of this Comment is divided into four sections. Part
II provides an overview of the conflict; specifically, it offers a descrip-
tion of Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics, and a look at the difficulty
federal district courts have had, and will continue to have, in interpreting
these cases. Part III presents the genesis of product-by-process patent
claims, from their inception to the present. Part IV examines the nexus
between the purpose of patent protection and the tension which exists
between the Scripps panel and the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel. It ana-
lyzes the reasoning of the two panels, considers whether each fits or
conflicts with product-by-process claim precedent, and proffers a sug-
gested method for district courts to utilize when analyzing the proper
scope of protection for product-by-process claims. The final section,
Part V, addresses what the current state of the law holds for biotechnol-
ogy companies who wish to patent their pharmaceutical and chemical
discoveries, and suggests a policy which would encourage these compa-
nies to create products that biotechnology, and society as a whole, will
demand in the future.
II. ScRIPPs CNINc & 4TL.NTIC iHERmOPLASTiCS
A. Scripps Clinic
Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.'6
involved a patent infringement suit over a substance labeled human Fac-
tor VIII:C, a complex protein that occurs naturally in normal blood and
is essential to blood clotting.' 7 Before the discovery of the invention
claimed in Scripps, researchers had been able to concentrate Factor
VIII:C in plasma, and doctors had used it to treat hemophilia. Unfortu-
nately, the process was too expensive and inefficient, forcing scientists
to search for an improvement.'
Dr. Zimmerman and Dr. Fulcher, working at the Scripps Clinic &
14. The Patent Act of 1952 is codified as amended in Title 35 of the U.S.C.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
17. Id. at 1568.
18. Some of the inefficiencies included the possibility of contamination and disease from




Research Foundation ("Scripps Clinic"), discovered that improvement
by isolating and characterizing Factor VIII:C through a process of chro-
matographic absorption. 19 Scripps Clinic secured a patent describing the
process, entitled "Ultrapurification of Factor VIII Using Monoclonal
Antibodies."20
Genentech began manufacturing its version of the substance using
recombinant-DNA production techniques. Scripps filed an infringement
claim in a federal district court,2' asserting that Genentech's recombi-
nantly-produced Factor VIII:C infringed its product-by-process claims,
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.22 After a somewhat
complex procedural history, including litigation in four separate cases,
23
consolidated appeals and cross-appeals reached the Federal Circuit.
The central issue in Scripps was whether product-by-process claims
are limited to the process set forth in the claim, or whether they cover
the product even if created by a different process. The Scripps panel
expressly held in favor of the latter.2 4 The court authorized Scripps
Clinic to claim purified Factor VIII:C having the characteristics of
human Factor VIII:C whether derived through Scripps's disclosed pro-
cess or any other process achieving the same result.25 The court noted
that the patentability of a product is based on its utility, novelty and
nonobviousness, even if the claim is a process claim.26 The court further
reasoned that it is the inherent characteristics of the product that are




The Atlantic Thermoplastics case involved a dispute between
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. ("Atlantic"), owner of a patent for a shock
absorbing shoe innersole that included a product-by-process patent
19. Id. at 1569. The process utilizes monoclonal antibodies specific to Factor VIII:RP and,
when completed, yields isolated Factor VIII:C. Id. RP stands for "related protein." Id. at 1568.
20. Id. at 1568.
21. See id. at 1568 n.1.
22. Id. at 1583. See generally ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND CoPRIGH IN A NUTSHELL 124-37 (1990).
23. Scripps, 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (granting partial summary judgment in favor
of Scripps Clinic on infringement); Scripps, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (granting partial
relief to defendants on motion for reconsideration); Scripps, 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on patent invalidity); Scripps, 724 F. Supp.
690 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (awarding defendants' attorney fees for plaintiff's inequitable conduct).
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claim,28 and Faytex Corp. ("Faytex"), which marketed innersoles manu-
factured by two separate companies-Surge Products and Sorbothane.29
Atlantic filed a claim against Faytex, asserting that both the Surge Prod-
ucts and the Sorbothane innersoles infringed its patent, and that Faytex
was liable for distributing these innersoles.
30
Only the Sorbothane process was at issue before the district court.3
Faytex defended, arguing that the Sorbothane process did not constitute
infringement because the process used to make the Sorbothane innersole
was different from the process in Atlantic's product-by-process claim.
The district court agreed with Faytex.32 Atlantic appealed, arguing that
because the Sorbothane process innersoles were indistinguishable from
the infringing innersoles made through the Surge process, infringement
had been established, 33 and that Scripps required a reversal of the non-
infringement finding.34 The Atlantic Thermoplastics panel, however,
rejected this argument.35
In reaching its conclusion, Atlantic Thermoplastics expressly
rejected the broad definition of product-by-process rights endorsed by
the Scripps panel. In the view of the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel, the
Scripps panel erroneously failed to consider United States Supreme
Court precedent36 when it held that product-by-process claims are not
limited to the process set forth in the claim, but instead cover the product
even if produced by a different process. Instead, the Atlantic
Thermoplastics panel held that the process in a product-by-process claim
should be considered to limit the patent's claim when determining
infringement3 7 Because the Sorbothane process was different than the
claimed process, the court concluded that the Sorbothane process could
not violate the patent.
C. Federal District Court Reaction
A split within the Federal Circuit is bound to create uncertainty in
28. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
29. Id. at 836.
30. Id. Surge Products and Sorbothane utilized different manufacturing processes. Id.
Atlantic asserted that both processes infringed its patent. Id.
31. Id. at 837. The parties agreed that the Surge Products process infringed Atlantic's patent.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 838.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 838-39, 838 n.2.
36. "A decision that fails to consider Supreme Court precedent does not control if the court
determines that the prior panel would have reached a different conclusion if it had considered
controlling precedent." Id. at 839 n.2 (citing Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1035 n.7 (1 th Cir.
1987)).
37. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 846-47.
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the federal district courts. At least one court, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, has already expressed confusion
over which holding it should apply.38 In Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc.,
the plaintiff relied upon Scripps and the defendant supported its argu-
ment with Atlantic Thermoplastics.39 The district court noted that its
dispute turned upon a prediction of the precedential effect the Federal
Circuit would give Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics.4 ° The district
court judge, forced to choose between the two rules, adopted the Atlantic
Thermoplastics approach simply because he believed that a majority of
the active members of the Federal Circuit bench would prefer that
approach.4 The court acknowledged that its predicament was an
uncomfortable one because whether its opinion would be affirmed or
reversed on appeal depended largely upon the randomly selected appel-
late panel.42 Until the dispute is resolved, other district courts will
undoubtedly feel similarly conflicted.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS PATENT CLAIMS
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101, four categories of inventions are pat-
entable: processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions
of matter.4 3 Machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of
matter are physical entities, and are therefore classified as product
claims. Similarly, claims which describe a physical activity are termed
process claims. Product-by-process claims are an amalgamation of the
two in that, although the patent cannot be issued without a new product
being invented, it is the process, rather than the end result, that is primar-
ily described in the patent claim.
38. See Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993). But see Fairfax Dental
v. Sterling Optical, 808 F. Supp. 326, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (determining that the Atlantic
Thermoplastics panel represented the entire Federal Circuit's opinion).
39. Tropix, 825 F. Supp. at 7-8.
40. Id. Curiously, the Tropix court denied a motion for certification of a question concerning
the proper precedent
41. Id. at 10. Since the dissenting and concurring opinions to the second denial of rehearing
en banc of Atlantic Thermoplastics were issued, an eleventh active judge has joined the court.
Whether this addition would affect the outcome of a vote if a similar issue was presented for en
banc review today is difficult to predict. Only one of the judges who voted to deny rehearing en
banc wrote an opinion, making it impossible to determine whether the rest of the Federal Circuit
judiciary supported the reasoning of the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel, or just believed that the
panel's interpretations of precedent were merely dictum.
42. See id.
43. Section 101 provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
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Traditionally the end product, and not the process for producing it,
is protected by a product-by-process claimant.' Because product-by-
process claims describe an article of manufacture or composition of mat-
ter in terms of how the product is made,45 it is important to remember
that the product itself must be new, useful and nonobvious to be afforded
46protection.
4
Acceptance of product-by-process patent claims began over a cen-
tury ago, in Ex parte Painter,47 and was based on the inability of patent
lawyers to effectively describe the end product that resulted from the
inventor's mechanisms. Painter's claim was for a bottle-stopper that
could only be described through product-by-process terms. 48  The
Painter court noted that "when a man has made an invention, his right to
a patent for it, or his right to a claim properly defining it, is not to be
determined by the limitations of the English language." '49 The court
therefore determined that when an invention "cannot be properly defined
and discriminated from prior art otherwise than by reference to the pro-
cess of producing it, a case is presented which constitutes an exception
to the rule [that inventions should not be described in process terms].
50
Thus, Painter established the necessity rule, whereby inventions could
be protected through process terms, but only if process terms were the
most accurate manner in which to describe the invention.5'
Over the next century, the necessity rule experienced constant
broadening and narrowing by federal courts. The cases describe a ten-
sion not unlike the Scripps-Atlantic Thermoplastics debate over the
proper scope of protection for product-by-process claims-as both con-
troversies inquire into the amount of patent protection that is necessary
to promote invention.
As noted in Painter, the CCPA initially adopted and applied the
necessity rule,5 2 permitting product-by-process claims only where the
44. In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345, 1348 (C.C.P.A. 1969); see also In re Lifton, 189 F.2d
261, 263 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Shortell, 173 F.2d 993 (C.C.P.A. 1949); In re Moeller, 117 F.2d
565, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1941).
45, 2 DONALD S. CHisuM, PATENTS § 8.05, at 8-81 (1991).
46. See In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
47. 1891 C.D. 200 (Comm'r of Pats. 1891).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 200-01.
50. Id.
51. As recently as 1974, the CCPA approved the Painter ruling, noting that it has been
permissible to claim a new product through process terms since at least 1891. In re Hughes, 496
F.2d 1216, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
52. In South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc), the
Federal Circuit adopted as precedent the law of the CCPA and the Court of Claims.
[Vol. 49:233
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invention could not otherwise be defined.53 Application of the rule
changed in In re Bridgeford,54 where the patent examiner rejected a pat-
ent application for composite polymeric material consisting of wood
fibers or cellulose fibers isolated from wood." The Bridgeford court
determined that it was appropriate to examine simply whether the prod-
uct-by-process claim is patentable and whether the application meets the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, which provides: "[t]he specification
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention. ' 56  Because section 112 places no limitations on how an
invention may be claimed, as long as the specification concludes with
claims which distinctly claim the invention,57 Bridgeford afforded pro-
tection to a product-by-process claim even if *the applicant could have
defined the invention in terms of its structure or novel physical
characteristics.5"
Three years later, in In re Pilkington,59 the CCPA endorsed protec-
tion for product-by-process claims where the claims distinguish the
product from prior art.6 This case involved the patent examiner's rejec-
tion of a claim for a "float glass" process for making sheet glass.6 The
Pilkington court held that product-by-process claims are proper where
the difference between the applicant's invention and the prior art are not
definable by structure.62 The Pilkington court cited In re Steppan63 with
approval, stating "Congress has placed no limitations on how an appli-
cant [may claim] his invention . . . ." Although Pilkington does not
explicitly contradict the necessity rule, it narrows its application by rea-
soning that product-by-process claims are proper where they are utilized
to distinguish the product from the prior art.65
In 1974, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure66 rejected the
53. See In re Litton, 189 F.2d 261, 263 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Moeller, 117 F.2d 565, 567
(C.C.P.A. 1941); In re Butler, 37 F.2d 623, 625 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
54. 357 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
55. Id. at 680.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984).
57. Id.
58. Bridgeford, 357 F.2d at 682-83. The Bridgeford court also recognized that, in patent
infringement suits, some courts have construed product-by-process claims as "covering only a
product made by the particular process set forth in the claim." Id. at 682 n.5.
59. 411 F.2d 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
60. Id. at 1349.
61. Id. at 1346.
62. Id. at 1349.
63. 394 F.2d 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
64. Pilkington, 411 F.2d at 1349 (quoting Steppan, 394 F.2d at 1013).
65. Id.
66. Section 706.03(e) reads "[a]n article may be claimed by a process of making it providing
it is definite." M.P.E.P. 706.03(e) (1987).
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necessity rule, determining that product-by-process terms are permissi-
ble as long as the requirements of Section 112 are satisfied.67 Two
months later, however, in In re Hughes,6" the CCPA declined to explic-
itly reject the necessity rule. Instead, the exception to the rule was
altered again. 9 The Hughes claim involved both process and product
claims for "shakes."7 The court decided that it would allow product-
by-process claims even where, as here, the invention could be otherwise
defined.71 The court further asserted that:
even if it is shown that the product can be broadly defined solely in
terms of structure ... where [the] product is incapable of description
by product claims which are of a different scope, [the inventor] is
entitled to product-by-process claims that recite his novel process of
manufacture as a hedge against the possibility that his broader prod-
uct claims might be invalidated.
72
Thus, an inventor is entitled to use a product-by-process claim to
describe a novel manufacturing process when he seeks to avoid the pos-
sibility that a broader product claim might be invalidated as overbroad.
Clearly, the CCPA has oscillated in its application of the necessity
rule. The current viewpoint is that "product-by-process claims should
always be allowed where the invention cannot otherwise be adequately
described, whether due to the inability of language to keep pace with
inventors or the inability of existing technology to determine just what
the invention is."'73 Thus, both the PTO and the federal courts tend to
find the necessity rule obsolete, and no longer strictly apply it when
considering the legitimacy of a claim.
Basic to the tension addressed by the courts in these cases is the
axiom that an invention is patentable only if it is useful, novel, and non-
obvious, even where the invention is described through process terms.74
As the CCPA has acknowledged, product-by-process claims create
unique problems in determining the nonobviousness and novelty of the
product.75 The central problem is the difficultly in determining the pat-
entability of a claimed product, and not the patentability of its process
steps, without a physical description of the product.76 In Application of
67. In making its decision, The Patent Office relied on Pilkington and Steppan.
68. 496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
69. Id. at 1219. The Hughes court found a "sound policy reason" for not abandoning the
necessity rule. Id. at 1218.
70. A "shake" is a single split from a short log of straight-grained wood. Id. at 1217 n.l.
71. Id. at 1219.
72. Id.
73. See Mirabel, supra note 3, at 3.
74. E.g., In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345, 1348 (C.C.P.A. 1969).




Brown, the court addressed this dilemma and held that "when the prior
art discloses a product which reasonably appears to be either identical
with or only slightly different than a product claimed in a product-by-
process claim, a rejection based on either section 10277 or section 10378
of the statute is eminently fair and acceptable. 79 Thus, the court
implied that the PTO has a lower burden of proof in product-by-process
proceedings for denying a claim because of obviousness in its process
than it would in a claim application that described an invention exclu-
sively through process terms. Moreover, this holding emphasizes that
even though product-by-process claims recite only process limitations,
courts are charged with determining the patentability of the claimed
product, and not solely the process steps used to manufacture the
product.80
IV. ANALYSIS
The tension between encouraging invention and preventing unfair
competition is a century-old battle fought in the federal courts. The
question of whether product-by-process claims should be limited to the
process described in the claims illustrates this ongoing struggle, as the
debate over the necessity rule did in the past. If, as Scripps suggests, the
product is protected notwithstanding a difference in process, improv-
ment in processes will be discouraged. If differences in processes are
considered, as Atlantic Thermoplastics suggests, then the invention of
products may be discouraged. The Constitution is deceptively clear in
describing where the battle line must be drawn: the courts must offer as
much protection as is necessary to further the promotion of science and
the useful arts.
The third Atlantic Thermoplastics dissent, written by the author of
the Scripps opinion, placed claims that contain both product and process
terms into three categories: (1) products that are new and nonobvious,
but are incapable of independent definition; (2) products that are old or
obvious, but have a new process; and (3) products that are new and
nonobvious, but have a process-based limitation (e.g. a molded prod-
uct).8 1 The dissent suggested that type (1) claims are examined as prod-
uct claims, requiring their validity to be based on the novelty and
77. Section 102 of the 1952 Patent Act requires that a claimed invention be novel. 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1984).
78. Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act requires that a claimed invention be nonobvious. 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1984).
79. Brown, 459 F.2d at 535.
80. In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 69 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (quoting Brown, 459 F.2d at 535).
81. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Newman,
C.J., dissenting from the court's denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Mirabel, supra note 3, at 3).
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nonobviousness of the product, while type (2) claims are examined as
process claims, where validity is based on the novelty and nonobvious-
ness of the process.8 2 Most importantly, this dissent stated that only
type (1) claims are properly characterized as product-by-process claims,
terming them "true" product-by-process claims.8 3 The dissent identified
the Scripps claim as a type (1) claim, which is infringed regardless of the
process used to make the product.8" It would distinguish the Atlantic
Thermoplastics claim as a type (2) claim, which is infringed only when
the same process is used.' 5
The conflicting holdings of Scripps and Atlantic have sparked
much interest, without resolving the uncertainty expressed by the court
in Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc.. Some commentators have failed to take
a stand on the debate. 6 Others have attempted to reconcile the two
cases, despite a strong opinion by the drafting judge in Atlantic
Thermoplastics that the cases are irreconcilable. 7  This leaves the
reader, and the courts, with limited guidance. More helpful would be a




86. See, e.g., Kendrew H. Colton & Michael W. Haas, Patent Law Developments in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1992, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 909,
1025-32 (1993).
87. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hymo & Richard A. Anderson, Product-By-Process Claims: Time
for Reexamination, 3 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 131 (1993). This article concludes that the holdings of
Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics are reconcilable. While the article is correct in stating that
Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics were both properly decided on their facts, the authors'
"reconciliation" of these cases does not help patent attorneys understand how to advise their
clients should a similar situation arise.
In addition, Judge Rader's concurrence to the second denial of rehearing en banc begins by
stating that "[i]n Atlantic Thermoplastics, the court reaffirmed, in the case of a product-by-process
claim, that claim language defines the bounds of patent protection. The Supreme Court and this
court have, without exception, followed this basic principle for all varieties of claims." Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rader, J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added). Thus, Judge Rader explicitly states that the
ruling in Atlantic Thermoplastics should apply to all product-by-process claims, and not just to
Atlantic's type of claim, which was a new process for an old product. Id. He also asserts that
"[t]he Atlantic Thermoplastics court tried to distinguish Atlantic's claims from those in Scripps
Clinic, but could not." Id. at 1302 n.3. As the author of the original Atlantic Thermoplastics
opinion, his analysis of the Court's intent in the original Atlantic Thermoplastic's opinion must be
given great weight.
By its own rule, the Federal Circuit was obligated to rehear Atlantic Thermoplastics en banc
if it improperly overruled Scripps, because the rule mandates that no panel of the Federal Circuit
may overrule another panel unless it does so en banc. FED. CIR. R. 35 (1993). By denying such a
rehearing, a majority of the Federal Circuit has implicitly accepted Atlantic Thermoplastics as
correct. Because that ruling specifically declares that it applies to all product-by-process claims, it
is pointless and incorrect to suggest, as Hymo & Anderson do, that the Federal Circuit will apply
the Scripps rule for some product-by-process claims, and the Atlantic Thermoplastics rle for
others.
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resolution of whether Scripps or Atlantic Thermoplastics is correct in
light of Supreme Court and other relevant authority. This section
engages in that analysis and, necessarily, addresses the overriding ques-
tion of which case espouses the interests that the Patent Act is designed
to further.
It is the conclusion of this Comment that the Scripps panel used the
proper approach when it determined that product-by-process claims are
not limited to the process set forth in the claim, but instead cover the
product even if produced by a different process."8 More importantly, it
is the position of this Comment that those who dissented from the denial
of rehearing Atlantic en banc correctly determined that this additional
protection is necessary to promote invention.
The Supreme Court has held that process claims are infringed only
when the same process is used. 9 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held
that product claims are infringed only when the same product is made.90
The Court, however, has not spoken with clarity on "true" product-by-
process claims. In fact, the only Supreme Court case to mention such
claims, Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,91 did so only in a
footnote. This is not surprising, however, because "[t]he facts of rela-
tively few cases relate to the class of product-by-process claims at issue
in Scripps, ' 92 which involved a "true" product-by-process claim.
In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court stated that "[a]s long as the end
product of the process is adequately defined and novel and nonobvious,
a patent in the process may support a patent in the resulting product. '93
The Bonito Boats Court's comment was merely a footnote comparison
of this type of product-by-process claim with the Florida statute at issue
in the case, which granted boat manufacturers substantial control over
the use of a particular process.94
The Supreme Court's guidance on the proper scope of protection
for product-by-process claims is limited to this statement. Therefore,
88. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
89. See Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884) (finding no
violation of process claim unless the alleged infringer used the process in the claimant's
specification to produce the article); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877) (concluding that
the plaintiff's invention was only a process and, therefore, the inventor could only claim the
particular process used to make the oil).
90. See General Electric Co. v. Wabash Co., 304 U.S. 364, 373 (1938) (holding that a product
claim must be distinguished from prior art).
91. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
92. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1297 (Newman, J.,
dissenting from the court's denial of rehearing en banc).
93. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 158 n.*.
94. Id.
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most "true" product-by-process claim law is a creation of the CCPA.
Prior to both Scripps and Atlantic Thermoplastics, the Federal Circuit
had not addressed whether the process description in a product-by-pro-
cess claim serves as a limit to the claim. Both the CCPA and the Federal
Circuit, however, had held that a product-by-process claim's patentabil-
ity depends upon the patentability of the product, and not the patentabil-
ity of the process.9
A. The Scripps Panel's Rationale
Scripps held that the scope of a product-by-process claim is not
limited to the process described in the claim.16 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Scripps panel cited two cases from the CCPA and one from the
Federal Circuit which held that the patentability of an invention that uses
product-by-process terminology is based on the patentability of the
product, and not the validity of the process.97 The Scripps court then
determined that the same method of interpretation must be used for pat-
entability and infringement purposes. 98
All three of the cases cited by Scripps involved "true" product-by-
process claims. Further, all of the precedential language used in its
opinion came from holdings, and not mere dicta. Most importantly, the
rule set forth by the Scripps panel fits into the legal landscape that
existed prior to its decision. Scripps simply used the previous holdings
of the CCPA and the Federal Circuit to address an issue that had not
been before either of those courts, and applied these holdings in a man-
ner consistent with its own precedent.
B. The Atlantic Thermoplastics Panel's Rationale
The Atlantic Thermoplastics panel was unable to distinguish the
Scripps claims from the Atlantic Thermoplastics claims and, thus, deter-
mined that the disputed claims "mirrored" each other.99 It also argued
that the Scripps patent discussed "little more than a process."' ° The
95. See In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that prior art pertinent only
to the product is proper ground for rejecting product-by-process claims); In re Brown, 459 F.2d
531, 535 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (in product-by-process claims, the patentability of the product must be
established independent of the process); In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682-83 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
(holding that patentability is determined independent of the process).
96. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
97. See id. (citing In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697-98 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Brown, 459 F.2d
531, 535 (C.C.P.A. 1972); and In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682-83 (C.C.P.A. 1966)).
98. Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583.
99. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299, 1302 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992)




panel concluded that the Scripps claim must be limited to the process in
its claim because there would otherwise be no limitations in the Atlantic
Thermoplastics claim.' 0
The Atlantic Thermoplastics judges grounded their opinion in an
analysis of Supreme Court and CCPA precedent.102 The panel cited a
line of Supreme Court cases01 a to establish the proposition that the pro-
cess described in a product-by-process claim is the limit of the claim.
The panel relied on Supreme Court dicta to support its position, claim-
ing "nothing can be held to infringe the patent which is not made by that
process."' 'o
Atlantic Thermoplastics concluded that Atlantic's product claim is
properly interpreted to include the process limitation stated in the
claim,10 5 asserting that if the process limitations of the claim were
ignored, there would be no limit to the claim and, thus, no way to deter-
mine infringement.' 0 6 Additionally, the court stated that the prosecution
history of Atlantic's patent did not show that the claim was intended to
be limited to a process.107
C. Supreme Court and CCPA Precedent
The Atlantic Thermoplastics panel's analysis is problematic from
the start, beginning with its discussion of General Electric and Plum-
mer. Importantly, these two cases involved product claims, not product-
by-process claims.
In General Electric,'08 a case revolving around a claim for a tung-
sten filament for incandescent lamps, the Supreme Court held that since
the claimant's patents were indistinguishable from prior art, they were
invalid. 0 9 In reasoning that this claim is synonymous with the claim in
101. Id.
102. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 838-46.
103. The cases included Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1877);
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222 (1880) (addressing the same patent which
was the subject of litigation in Smith); General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S.
364 (1938); Plumer v. Sargent, 120 U.S. 442 (1887); Merill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877); and
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, III U.S. 293 (1884).
104. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1302 (quoting Cochrane, Ill U.S. at 310 (Rader, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)). A concurring opinion to the second denial of
rehearing en banc mocked the dissenting argument's classification of product-by-process claims.
Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1302. First, it stated that no court has ever categorized some
product-by-process claims as "true." Id. at 1303. Second, it implied that type (2) claims, which
encompass products that are old or obvious but have a new process, are simply invalid. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1301.
108. 304 U.S. 364 (1938).
109. Id. at 373. See also 2 DONALD S. CHIsUM, PATENTS § 8.05 (1991). Chisum writes that
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Scripps, the Atlantic Thermoplastics court quotes General Electric:
"[A] patentee who does not distinguish his product from what is old
except by reference, express or constructive, to the process by which he
produced it, cannot secure a monopoly on the product by whatever
means produced."' 0 This statement cannot rationally be applied to
Scripps. First, it is mere dictum. Additionally, the claim in Scripps was
a product-by-process claim, and the claim in General Electric was a
product claim. Finally, unlike the claim in General Electric, the Scripps
claim was for a complex protein that was clearly new and nonobvious.
Thus, the Atlantic Thermoplastics analysis of Supreme Court precedent
was erroneous. As the next section will show, it was also unnecessary
and, thus, inappropriate.
The panel also utilized Plummer v. SargeantI' to support its prop-
osition that the process described in a product-by-process claim serves to
limit the scope of the claim. In Plummer, the Supreme Court was unable
to distinguish the claimant's end product from the alleged infringer's
end product, and was forced to compare the processes. 1 2 After deter-
mining that the processes were indeed different, the Court upheld the
lower court's noninfringement ruling.'" 3 Plummer did not involve a
"true" product-by-process claim" 4 and is therefore not applicable to
Scripps.
Next, the Atlantice Thermoplastics panel addressed a series of
Supreme Court cases which involved process claims, and not product-
by-process claims. The panel misinterpreted Smith v. Goodyear Dental
Vulcanite Co.,"15 where the defendant Smith argued that it had not
infringed Goodyear's patent because it had not used Goodyear's process
to make its celluloid dental plate." 6 Goodyear's process had distin-
guished its claim from prior art, because the claimed product, a plate for
most courts have held that a product-by-process claim is infringed "only by a product made
through a substantially identical process." Id. § 8.05 at 8-81 (citing Cochrane v. Badische Anilin
& Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884)). The Atlantic Thermoplastics panel found, however,
that the cases which Chisum cites as holding in the alternative were patentability cases, and not
patent infringement cases. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 842 n.8
(Fed. Cir. 1992). See also 3 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LWscom's WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 11:19 (3d ed. 1985); 1 IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 5B.05[2] (1991); 2
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 2.6(10] (2d ed. 1991).
110. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1292 (quoting General Electric, 304 U.S. at 373)
(alteration in original).
111. 120 U.S. 442 (1877).
112. Id. at 449-50.
113. Id. at 450.
114. See discussion, supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
115. 93 U.S. 486 (1877).
116. Id. at 493-94.
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holding artificial teeth, was previously known (i.e., not novel)."' 7 The
Supreme Court determined that Goodyear's claim was merely a process
claim, and that there was therefore no infringement because Smith had
used a different process.'18 Thus, the claim in Smith was a process claim
and not a product-by-process claim, and is substantially different from
Scripps's claim.
The Atlantic Thermoplastics court next cited Goodyear Vulcanite
Co. v. Davis"19 for the proposition that a product-by-process patent
infringement only occurs where both the product and the process are
infringed.120 The court interpreted this statement to mean that if patent
infringement defendants use a different process to make a product than
the process described in a plaintiff's product-by-process claim, no
infringement has occurred.' 2 1 This reasoning is flawed, however,
because the Atlantic Thermoplastics court misread Davis. The Davis
Court held that the claim was for a process, and that there was no
infringement because the defendant employed a different process.
122
The same process was required for a finding of infringement in Davis
because the claim was a process claim. The Supreme Court did not
determine that product-by-process claims are only protected if the same
process is used; it simply held that a process claim is not infringed
unless an accused infringer uses a claimant's process.
The Atlantic Thermoplastics panel cited Merrill v. Yeomans,123 yet
another case which does not support its position. There, the Court held
that the inventor had claimed only a process, and not a product.' 24 The
Court therefore concluded that the patent at issue did not involve a prod-
uct-by-process claim. 12s Merrill, therefore, is easily distinguishable on
its facts: Merrill did not involve a product-by-process claim.
Finally, the Atlantic Thermoplastic panel buttressed its analysis of
Supreme Court precedent by referencing the Court's statement in Coch-
rane that "[e]very patent for a product or composition of matter must
identify it so that it can be recognized aside from the description of the
process for making it, or else nothing can be held to infringe the patent
117. Id. at 493.
118. Id. at 494-95.
119. 102 U.S. 222 (1881).
120. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing
Davis, 102 U.S. at 224).
121. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 839.
122. Davis, 102 U.S. at 229.
123. 94 U.S. 568 (1877).
124. Id. at 573-74.
125. Id. at 571.
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which is not made by that process."' 26 Standing alone, this statement is
quite persuasive. A- proper interpretation of the statement, however,
requires that it be placed in its correct context.
In Cochrane, the claim was for an artificial alizarine made through
"either of the methods described, or by any other method, equivalent or
not, which will produce anything called artificial alizarine."127 The
Supreme Court determined the product to be an old article of manufac-
ture. 128 The Court limited the holding to its facts, determining that this
new process for producing the product was patentable, but the product
itself was not. 129 No infringement occurred because the accused product
was not made by the claimed process. 130
The Atlantic Thermoplastics court correctly analogized the Coch-
rane claim to Atlantic's claim, as they both fit into the type (2) category
of products that are old or obvious but have a new process. That panel,
however, failed to recognize an important distinction. Although the
claims in both Cochrane and Atlantic Thermoplastics were old or obvi-
ous but had a new process, not all product-by-process claims may prop-
erly be described as such. The Scripps claim clearly illustrates this
point, as that claim was new and nonobvious.
Additionally, the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel addressed a series
of cases from the CCPA, and made the same mistakes it made in its
analysis of Supreme Court precedent. It determined that, as a whole,
CCPA precedent regards the process language in product-by-process
claims as a limitation on that patent claim. The panel's errors lie in that
it examined CCPA cases that involved product claims or process claims,
but not product-by-process claims.
The court cited In re Hughes,13 ' a case which only addressed the
issue of patentability. There, the CCPA held that where it is impossible
to describe an invention through structural or physical characteristics,
the claimant could use a product-by-process claim.'32 Atlantic
Thermoplastics interpreted this holding as stating that "the process
defines and limits the scope of the claim."' 33 In a case addressing
infringement issues, In re Moeller, 34 the CCPA stated that infringement
protection for product-by-process claimants is limited to articles pro-
126. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(quoting Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 310 (1884)).
127. Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 312.
128. Id. at 311.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 311-12.
131. 496 F.2d 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
132. Id. at 1219.
133. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
134. 117 F.2d 565 (C.C.P.A. 1941).
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duced by the methods referred to in the claims. In its conclusion, the
Atlantic Thermoplastics panel improperly extended the Hughes and
Moeller holdings beyond their appropriate application.1 35 Moreover, the
panel erroneously determined that ignoring the process limitations in
Atlantic's product-by-process claim would amount to a blatant disregard
of the doctrine of equivalents.
136
In sum, the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel determined that Supreme
Court dicta supported the position that the process described in a prod-
uct-by-process claim limits the claim, whether the product was new or
old. Furthermore, it interpreted CCPA authority to conclude that the
process in a product-by-process patent is a limitation on the patent
claim. The Supreme Court and CCPA authority on which the Atlantic
Thermoplastics court chose to rely is suspect, however, because it
involved product claims or process claims, and not product-by-process
claims.
D. The Real Issue in Atlantic Thermoplastics
At issue before the Atlantic Thermoplastics court was whether
Atlantic's claim was limited to its process.137 It was not, as the court's
opinion suggests, whether all product-by-process claims are limited to
the process in those claims. Atlantic admitted that its claim was limited
to the process by which it is made. 31 Specifically, claim 24 of the pat-
ent states "[t]he molded innersole produced by the method of claim
1 . Thus, the claim explicitly accepted a limitation.
Judge Lourie noted that "[i]f the inventor said his claim was limited
to the process and if the accused infringer didn't use that process, then
the issue is decided."' Because this is exactly what occurred, the
135. The Atlantic Thermoplastics panel had no reason to examine Hughes or Moeller because
the claims at issue in Atlantic Thermoplastics contained process limitations.
136. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For a
discussion on the doctrine of equivalents, see generally ARmU R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 126-28
(1990). The doctrine of equivalents states that if an accused invention is substantially equivalent
to the claimant's invention, infringement will be found to exist. Id. at 127. An invention is
substantially equivalent if "the skilled practitioner would know of the practical interchangeability
of the accused infringement's elements with those specifically identified in the patent
specification." Id. The purpose of this doctrine is to prevent individuals from making minor
changes to an invention, and claiming the new invention as their own. Id. at 127-28. The Atlantic
Thermoplastics panel held that the Sorbothane dam and liquid elastomer were substantially
different from Atlantic's solid elastomer with inherent tack and, therefore, there was no
infringement. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
137. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 970 F.2d at 838.
138. See id. at 838-39, 838 n.2.
139. Id. at 836.
140. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Lourie, J., dissenting from the court's denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Lourie asserted that
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proper action by the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel would have been to
simply state that claim 24 of Atlantic's U.S. Patent No. 4,674,204 alone
is limited to its process because the claim so concedes.
Instead, the panel journeyed through the history of product-by-pro-
cess claims and formulated a ruling that applies to all such claims.' 4 1 A
reinterpretation of Supreme Court and CCPA precedent was not only
unnecessary, it amounts to either a declaratory judgment or improper
review of an issue that was not before the court.
E. The Atlantic Thermoplastics Approach vs. the Scripps Approach
Even though it is inconsistent with precedent, the Atlantic
Thermoplastics holding is not without merit. Under its narrow view, the
process in the product-by-process claim is the claim's limitation when
determining infringement. 42 A complex biological or chemical claim
would be limited to the exact process by which the claimant described it,
permitting other inventors to develop new, and possibly more economi-
cal, processes for making the same product. The limitation provides
greater incentive to create more efficient processes because the discov-
erer of the new process can profit from both the process and the end
product. Clearly, the right to market the end product of drug and chemi-
cal research is more valuable to an inventor than having to sell the new
process to the patent holder of the end product. This reasoning is
endorsed by all of the active Federal Circuit judges who do not have any
experience practicing or studying patent law.
Under the Scripps approach, a product-by-process patent covers a
product no matter how it is produced. This method affords the inventor
greater protection from infringement than the Atlantic Thermoplastics
the Atlantic panel wrote an overbroad holding, and found that the issue could have been decided
without an analysis of precedent. Id. at 1298-99. A second basis for this dissent was that Atlantic
Thermoplastics's overruling of Scripps violated Federal Circuit local rules, which state that a prior
panel's decision may only be overruled en banc. FED. CIR. R. 35. When Congress created the
Federal Circuit in 1982, one of its goals was to create uniform patent opinions. DeBenedictis,
supra note 3, at 36. Since the court's creation, all of the patent appeals from the district courts
have been heard before the Federal Circuit. Atlantic Thermoplastics, 974 F.2d at 1280.
Moreover, until Atlantic Thermoplastics, no panel had ever overruled another without en banc
review. Id. at 1281. The dissent argued that Atlantic Thermoplastics 's ruling amounted to blatant
disregard of well-established procedure and Congressional mandate. Id. at 1299.
Judge Rich's dissent addressed this issue as well, emphatically stating another local rule:
"where there are conflicting precedents, the earlier precedent controls." Id. at 1281. Judge Rich's
dissent noted that the parties agreed that the claim was limited to the process by which the
innersoles were made. Id. at 1280. He further argued it was improper to establish a rule of law
affecting complex drug and chemical cases when the parties briefed the issue only with respect to
innersoles. Id.
141. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 838-46 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
142. Id. at 846-47.
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approach. Arguably, this method provides less incentive for inventors to
improve the efficiency of the processes claimed in their product-by-pro-
cess claim because anyone who discovers a new process can market
only that new process. It is equally true, however, that the Scripps rule,
which supports a broad scope of protection, provides greater incentive to
create new products.
All of the active Federal Circuit judges who have spent their
careers as scientists and/or patent attorneys vigorously support the
Scripps approach. Judge Rich co-authored the 1952 Patent Act, prac-
ticed patent law for twenty-five years, taught patent law for twenty-
seven years, and has heard patent appeals since 1956. Judge Lourie
practiced patent law for twenty-six years and has published several pat-
ent law articles. Chief Judge Nies practiced patent law for twenty-eight
years, has served in several editorial capacities, and has published
numerous articles. Judge Newman, the Scripps author, has worked as a
research chemist, practiced patent law, and directed several national
chemical and patent organizations. Their knowledge and understanding
of patent law is surpassed by few, if any. It is also extremely likely that
their similar academic backgrounds resulted in similar interpretations of
product-by-process claims.
The split between the patent and non-patent panels raises the ques-
tion of who is the most desirable proponent of patent law policy? It is
possible that judges who lack patent backgrounds are likely to be more
concerned with preventing unfair competition than encouraging inven-
tion. It is also possible that former patent attorneys will be markedly
pro-patent and favor rules which protect claimants from infringement.
On the other hand, it also is likely that the judges with patent experience
will be in a better position than the other members of the Federal Circuit
judiciary to analyze the effects of policies and interpret the Patent Act.
Those judges who dissented from the court's denial of rehearing en
banc did not disagree with the result in Atlantic Thermoplastics; they
agreed that Faytex did not infringe Atlantic's claim by manufacturing
Sorbothane process innersoles. Their discordance came from the over-
ruling of Scripps through an analysis of an issue which was not properly
before the Atlantic Thermoplastics panel and should not have been
undertaken. An overbroad holding in a case involving innersoles, which
was argued only with respect to innersoles, may affect the entire chemi-
cal industry. The Scripps method is more appropriate for fostering the
purpose of the Patent Act.
Had the Atlantic Thennoplastics panel distinguished type (1)
claims from type (2) claims, its holding would be acceptable. But Judge
Rader made it clear in his concurrence to the second denial of rehearing
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en banc that he did not intend for the Atlantic Thermoplastics holding to
be limited to type (2) claims. In fact, he specifically declared that
the Atlantic Thermoplastics ruling applies to all product-by-process
claims. 1
43
The correct approach is to apply Atlantic Thermoplastics's rule
only to type (2) claims-those which are for products that are old or
obvious, but have a new process. The rule is completely improper for
type (1) claims-those which are for products that are new and unobvi-
ous, but are not capable of independent definition. If a new process is
created to manufacture an existing product, patent protection should
only be permitted for the new process. This rule may indeed prevent
those who develop new processes from being able to market their new
processes without cooperating with the product patent holders, but it
would ensure the product inventor of full protection for his product, and
the process inventor of full protection for his process.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's conflicting opinions have left biotechnology
law, as it relates to the proper scope of protection for patent claims, in a
state of disarray. It is unfortunate that other district courts may agree
with the decision in Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc. and choose to follow
the Atlantic Thermoplastics holding, because this approach inhibits
pharmaceutical and chemical research and development. Limiting the
scope of protection for the few new products that actually reach the mar-
ketplace will further retard investment. The Atlantic Thermoplastics
court's narrow view of infringement protection discourages new
research and development ventures.
The proper scope of protection from infringement for product-by-
process claims is an issue which duts to the heart of the purpose of Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution. The extent
to which product-by-process claims are protected is clearly analogous to
one's vision of the scope of protection afforded to inventors through the
Constitution. Moreover, the United States Patent Act was created to
promote the progress of science and useful arts.' 44 Its intention is to
encourage inventors by providing a reward, in the form of a patent
claim, as incentive for developing new products. 4
If one believes that science is better promoted by permitting inven-
tors to market inventions which contain novel processes for a product
143. Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(Rader, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).




which exists in prior art, and allowing these inventors to receive royal-
ties on both the product and the process even though they had nothing to
do with inventing the actual product, then the Atlantic Thermoplastics
view is correct. If, on the other hand, one looks straight to the text of the
Patent Clause of the United States Constitution, where new products and
useful arts are temporarily protected by securing exclusive rights, it is
apparent that the Scripps approach is proper.
The necessity rule's requirement that product-by-process terminol-
ogy be permitted only in claims that cannot be otherwise described is
now obsolete. Similarly, the end product described in a product-by-pro-
cess claim should be protected, regardless of the process that is used to
create that product.
Judge Rich's dissent mentions a procedural rule of the Federal Cir-
cuit which states that where there are conflicting precedents, the earlier
precedent controls. 146 This rule is fortunate because in order to effec-
tively promote invention exclusive rights to inventions must be secured,
and exclusive protection is what the Scripps holding advocates.
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